quillori

Posted by Victor Mair

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For English speakers, a mind-boggling letter to the editor on linguistic gender from the Times Literary Supplement (3/9/25):

Masculine and feminine

In Cristina Rivera Garza’s Death Takes Me, reviewed by Lucy Popescu (In Brief, April 18), a character points out that “in Spanish, the word victim, or victima, is always feminine”. This is evidently true, but it would be wrong to draw conclusions regarding any inherently gendered notions of victimhood from this fact; the Spanish word for person (la persona) is also feminine, but it does not therefore follow that persons are essentially female.

Many languages have a range of noun classifications and, while gender is among them, this has nothing to do with femininity or masculinity. Gender has the same root as genre and genus, so, in a grammatical context, refers to the category of a noun and is usually determined by its final syllable; hence, victima is “feminine” because it ends with an “a”. English-speakers, accustomed to a mother tongue without such noun classifications, may find it difficult to divorce the idea of gender from concepts of male/female, let alone avoid the temptation to find significance in a word’s gender. But many nouns belong to a gender category at complete variance with their meaning: the Spanish word for masculinity (la masculinidad) is feminine because -idad is a feminine ending. In contrast, el feminismo (feminism) is masculine because -ismo is a masculine ending. Nor is it only in Romance languages where such discrepancies occur; like its Spanish and French counterparts, the German word for “manliness” (die Männlichkeit) is feminine.

Etymologically, all versions of the word victim derive from the Latin victima and originally referred to a living creature offered in sacrifice to a deity. While meaning and usage have broadened over time to signify someone hurt by another in some way, conflating the word victim with concepts of the feminine risks presenting women as passive and powerless.

Rory McDowall Clark
St Leonards-on-Sea, East Sussex

Selected readings

See the Language Log archive on gender.

[Thanks to Leslie Katz]

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Posted by Mark Liberman

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In Daniel Dennett's 1995 book Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life, the chapter titled "Chomsky contra Darwin, Four Episodes" ends with this provocative sentence:

The hostility to Artificial Intelligence and its evil twin, Darwinism, lies just beneath the surface of much of the most influential work in recent twentieth-century philosophy.

What Dennett meant by "Artificial Intelligence" in 1995 was no doubt rather different from what people take the word to mean now. Still, the intended meaning of his aphorism remains intact and relevant.

You need to start with his distinction between "skyhooks" and "cranes", described here by Wikipedia. And then read about how he learned that Noam Chomsky rejected Darwinism as  form of epistemelogical empiricism, i.e. a "crane" that learns in the genome rather than the neurome:

In March 1978, I hosted a remarkable debate at Tufts, staged, appropriately, by the Society for Philosophy and Psychology. Nominally a panel discussion on the foundations and prospects of Artificial Intelligence, it turned into a tag-team rhetorical wrestling match between four heavyweight ideologues: Noam Chomsky and Jerry Fodor attacking AI, and Roger Schank and Terry Winograd defending it. Schank was working at the time on programs for natural language comprehension, and the critics focused on his scheme for representing (in a computer) the higgledy-piggledy collection of trivia we all know and somehow rely on when deciphering ordinary speech acts, allusive and truncated as they are. Chomsky and Fodor heaped scorn on this enterprise, but the grounds of their attack gradually shifted in the course of the match, for Schank is no slouch in the bully-baiting department, and he staunchly defended his research project. Their attack began as a straightforward, “first-principles” condemnation of conceptual error—Schank was on one fool’s errand or another—but it ended with a striking concession from Chomsky: it just might turn out, as Schank thought, that the human capacity to comprehend conversation (and, more generally, to think) was to be explained in terms of the interaction of hundreds or thousands of jerry-built gizmos, but that would be a shame, for then psychology would prove in the end not to be “interesting.” There were only two interesting possibilities, in Chomsky’s mind: psychology could turn out to be “like physics” — its regularities explainable as the consequences of a few deep, elegant, inexorable laws — or psychology could turn out to be utterly lacking in laws—in which case the only way to study or expound psychology would be the novelist’s way (and he much preferred Jane Austen to Roger Schank, if that were the enterprise).

A vigorous debate ensued among the panelists and audience, capped by an observation from Chomsky’s colleague at MIT Marvin Minsky: “I think only a humanities professor at MIT could be so oblivious to the third ‘interesting’ possibility: psychology could turn out to be like engineering.” Minsky had put his finger on it. There is something about the prospect of an engineering approach to the mind that is deeply repugnant to a certain sort of humanist, and it has little or nothing to do with a distaste for materialism or science. Chomsky was himself a scientist, and presumably a materialist (his “Cartesian” linguistics did not go that far!), but he would have no truck with engineering. It was somehow beneath the dignity of the mind to be a gadget or a collection of gadgets. Better the mind should turn out to be an impenetrable mystery, an inner sanctum for chaos, than that it should turn out to be the sort of entity that might yield its secrets to an engineering analysis!

Though I was struck at the time by Minsky’s observation about Chomsky, the message didn’t sink in. […]

That's the crux of the "evil twins" idea: maybe the mind is a collection of gadgets, evolved by learning in the genome, the neurome, and culturome, and suitable for analysis by engineering techniques.

After touching on John Searle, Stephen Jay Gould, Steven Pinker, Herbert Spencer, McCullough and Pitts,  B.F. Skinner, Charles Babbage, Alan Turing, and others, Dennett zeroes in on Searle, ending the chapter with the "evil twins" sentence:

According to Searle, only artifacts made by genuine, conscious human artificers have real functions. Airplane wings are really for flying, but eagles’ wings are not. If one biologist says they are adaptations for flying and another says they are merely display racks for decorative feathers, there is no sense in which one biologist is closer to the truth. If, on the other hand, we ask the aeronautical engineers whether the airplane wings they designed are for keeping the plane aloft or for displaying the insignia of the airline, they can tell us a brute fact. So Searle ends up denying William Paley’s premise: according to Searle, nature does not consist of an unimaginable variety of functioning devices, exhibiting design. Only human artifacts have that honor, and only because (as Locke “showed” us) it takes a Mind to make something with a function!

Searle insists that human minds have “Original” Intentionality, a property unattainable in principle by any R-and-D process of building better and better algorithms. This is a pure expression of the belief in skyhooks: minds are original and inexplicable sources of design, not results of design. He defends this position more vividly than other philosophers, but he is not alone. The hostility to Artificial Intelligence and its evil twin, Darwinism, lies just beneath the surface of much of the most influential work in recent twentieth-century philosophy, as we shall see in the next chapter.

If you're interested, you should read the whole chapter, and indeed the whole book.

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Posted by Mark Liberman

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Elizabeth Ribbens, "How the use of a word in the Guardian has gotten some readers upset", The Guardian 6/4/2025:

‘Got’ was changed during the editing of an opinion piece, leading to correspondence lamenting a slide into American English. But language isn’t a fortress.

In Shakespeare’s Henry VI, Part II, a messenger breathlessly announces to the king that, “Jack Cade hath gotten London bridge”. Hold this late 16th-century text in mind as we fast forward to last week when Martin Kettle, associate editor and columnist at the Guardian in the UK, was seen to suggest in an opinion piece that, if King Charles has pushed the boundaries of neutrality, such as with his speech to open the new Canadian parliament, he has so far “gotten away with it”.

In a letter published the next day, a reader asked teasingly if this use of “gotten” – and another writer’s reference to a “faucet” – were signs the Guardian had fallen into line with Donald Trump’s demand that news agencies adopt current US terminology, such as referring to the “Gulf of America”.

Another, who wrote to me separately, had first seen the article in the print edition and expected subeditors (or copy editors, if you wish) would eventually catch up and remove “gotten”, which “is not a word in British English”. She was surprised to find the online version not only unchanged but with the phrase repeated in the headline.

FWIW, the cited opinion piece has now been edited to use got rather than gotten:

Geoff Pullum's comment:

David Crystal is quoted on the point that Am uses both forms, but he doesn't explain the contrast between them, because that would involve him in a tricky little area of semantics relating to the difference between actions (He has gotten away with it) and states (He has got a lot of nerve).

Or a minimal pair like

• Kim has gotten Parkinsonism.
• Kim has got Parkinsonism.

Of course the socio-morpho-semantics of got(ten) is more complicated than that — most of the issues are covered in the got, gotten entry in Merriam-Webster 's Concise Dictionary of English Usage. I'll leave it to the commenters to excavate further.

But in terms of socio-geographical evolution, Google Books Ngrams suggests that the British anti-gotten faction are losing — here's the plot for "British English", showing that has gotten started rising around 1980 and has now topped 14%:

The plot for "American English" shows has gotten has been rising since 1865 or ao, and is now above 46%:

Again, there are aspectual and other semantic choices as well as morphological preferences, but it's clearly true that there's a geographical issue, and a secular change in favor of the American (and Shakespearean) choice. (Although Google Books' geographical assignment of publications is far from perfect…)

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Posted by Mark Liberman

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More than 20 years ago, I posted about the explosion of -ome and -omic words in biology: "-ome is where the heart is", 10/27/2004. I listed more than 40 examples:

behaviourome, cellome, clinome, complexome, cryptome, crystallome, ctyome, degradome, enzymome,epigenome, epitome, expressome, fluxome, foldome, functome, glycome, immunome, ionome, interactome, kinome, ligandome, localizome, metallome, methylome, morphome, nucleome, ORFeome, parasitome, peptidome, phenome, phostatome, physiome, regulome, saccharome, secretome, signalome, systeome, toponome, toxicome, translatome, transportome, vaccinome, and variome.

Plenty of important examples were left off that list, for example proteome.

One -ome example that I recently learned is exposome, whose meaning should be obvious, but is lucidly explained in a 2005 paper by Christopher Wild, which Wiktionary credits with coining the term —  "Complementing the genome with an 'exposome': the outstanding challenge of environmental exposure measurement in molecular epidemiology":

Partially as a consequence of the emphasis on genotyping, the accurate assessment of many environmental exposures remains an outstanding and largely unmet challenge in cancer epidemiology. As measurement of one half of the gene:environment equation continues to be refined, the other remains subject to a large degree of misclassification. […]

The imbalance in measurement precision of genes and environment has consequences, most fundamentally in compromising the ability to fully derive public health benefits from expenditure on the human genome and the aforementioned cohort studies. There is a desperate need to develop methods with the same precision for an individual's environmental exposure as we have for the individual's genome. I would like to suggest that there is need for an “exposome” to match the “genome.” This concept of an exposome may be useful in drawing attention to the need for methodologic developments in exposure assessment.

The OED has yet to award exposome its Word Induction Ceremony,  although Google Scholar estimates 45,000 hits.

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